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Abstract. In electronic auction applications, small-value merchandise
is often distributed. We call this kind of auction micro auction. Com-
pared to traditional general-purpose electronic auction, micro electronic
auction has its own special requirements. Especially, micro auction must
be very efficient: the cost of the auction protocol must not be over the
cost of the merchandise for sale. Although the merchandise to distribute
are of small value in micro auctions, bid privacy is still needed in many
circumstances. So sealed-bid auction mechanism has to be employed in
micro auction. Therefore, a question is raised: how to balance between
the high efficiency requirement of micro auction and the high cost needed
to keep bid privacy. In this paper, the traditional sealed-bid e-auction
techniques are modified to satisfy the special requirements of sealed-bid
micro auction. Two existing general-purpose electronic sealed-bid auc-
tion schemes are modified into micro sealed-bid auction schemes. The
new schemes are secure and suitable for micro auction. One of them
is further improved in efficiency to meet more critical requirements in
certain micro auction applications.
1 Introduction
Auctions have a long history as an effective method to distribute goods fairly.
In recent years, electronic auctions on the Internet are becoming more and more
popular. Due to security concerns for the network environment and payment
method (often through the Internet too), electronic auction is more often used to
distribute small-value merchandise. We call auction of small-value merchandise
micro auction, which needs studying in the electronic form (through computer
network). In any kind of auction, a basic principle should be followed: the cost of
the auction protocol must not be over the value of the merchandise to distribute.
So high efficiency is a key requirement for micro auction.
In this paper, after detailed analysis sealed-bid auction is chosen as an ap-
propriate mechanism to implement micro auction. Unfortunately, all the exist-
ing sealed-bid auction schemes with bid privacy are only suitable for large-value
merchandise. Although they are more efficient than double auction, they are
still too inefficient for micro auction. They need a large number of exponentia-
tions in computation, whose cost may be over the value of merchandise in micro
auctions. So special sealed-bid auction schemes suitable for micro auction must
be designed. To our knowledge there is no research work focused on sealed-bid
micro auctions. In this paper, security and efficiency of sealed-bid micro auction
are discussed and sealed-bid micro auction schemes with satisfactory security
properties are designed.
A simple and practical solution to efficient secure micro sealed-bid e-auction
is to modify and optimize appropriate existing secure general-purpose sealed-bid
e-auction into micro auction schemes. Among the two common methods to design
secure sealed-bid e-auction, secure evaluation and one-choice-per-price strategy,
one-choice-per-price strategy is more suitable for micro auction as it can more
easily achieve high efficiency in micro auction. In this paper two secure micro
sealed-bid e-auction schemes are designed based on existing sealed-bid auction
schemes employing one-choice-per-price strategy. Both schemes can satisfy the
security requirements for micro auction and are efficient, thus are suitable for
auction of small-value merchandise. The second scheme is especially efficient as
it is improved in efficiency by using the idea of batch proof. Batch proof in this
paper employs an idea similar to efficiency improvement measures in some micro
payment systems [1]. It aggregately proves validity of a few random subsets of
bid opening operations to publicly prove validity of bid opening with a large
probability. After the improvement, only a small constant number of exponen-
tiations are needed in the second scheme. Although the improvement sacrifices
instant verifiability and cannot detect invalid operation by the auctioneers until
a final verification, the sacrifice is tolerable in micro auctions.
2 Requirements
As stated in Section 1, high efficiency is a very important requirement for micro
auction. The most efficient auction in computation is open cry auction. In the
open cry auctions, the bids are cried out openly and the auction result is publicly
decided. As no bid is sealed, it is very efficient in computation. However, open
cry auction cannot satisfy many micro auction applications as it is inefficient in
communication and reveals all the bids. The open cry mechanism requires each
bidder to remain on-line and repeatedly communicate with the auctioneer to
update their bids. Very few bidders are willing to pay such a communicational
cost for low-value merchandise. There are many reasons to keep bids secret.
For example, a bidder may not want to permit other bidders to choose their
bids according to his bid; the bidders may not want to permit the seller (or
auctioneer) to design selling strategy in the future according to their bids; a
bidder may want to keep his bid secret for personal privacy. All these reasons
are independent of the value of the merchandise to sell. So like in auctions with
large-value merchandise, confidentiality (or privacy) of bids are often required in
micro auctions. An auction mechanism to achieve efficient communication and
conceal the bids is double auction, which supports multiple sellers and bidders
and a deal is made once a bid is no lower than a seller’s offer. Double auction
supports real-time deal, which may be preferred in micro auction. However,
double auction is too inefficient in computation for micro auction.
Sealed-bid auction seems to be a good auction mechanism for micro auction,
especially when high efficiency (both in computation and communication) and
bid privacy are required. In a sealed-bid auction, a bidder has to submit a sealed
bid before a closing time. After the closing time one or more auctioneers open the
bids to decide the winners according to a pre-defined rule. Sealed-bid auction
is more efficient than double auction while many existing sealed-bid auction
schemes conceal the bids. Most security requirements in existing sealed-bid e-
auction [3, 4] are also desired in micro auction. They are as follows.
1. Correctness: the auction result must be determined exactly according to the
auction rule.
2. Public Verifiability: correctness of the auction must be publicly verifiable.
3. Fairness: no bidder can get more information than other bidders at each
stage of the auction.
4. Bid confidentiality: each bid must remain confidential to other bidders and
the auctioneer(s) before the bid opening phase starts.
5. Non-repudiation: no bidder can deny his bid.
6. Robustness: the auction can still work properly in abnormal situations
7. Rule Flexibility: various auction rules must be supported.
8. Bid Privacy: the losing bids are kept secret even after the auction.
As the cost of an auction protocol must not be over the value of the merchan-
dise on sale, high efficiency is very important to micro auction. Implementation
of any security property must be efficient. When necessary, appropriate trade-
off must be made between security and efficiency. For example, correctness and
public verifiability of micro auction may be achieved only with a large proba-
bility instead of absolutely, so that high efficiency is not compromised. On the
condition that any incorrect operation can be publicly detected with a large
probability, it is reasonable to assume that nobody will risk his reputation and
qualification for a small-value merchandise. This idea has been used in some mi-
cro payment systems [1], where only a small subset of operations are verified. As
these verified operations are randomly chosen, their validity can guarantee that
the whole protocol is correctly carried out with a large probability. This idea of
partial verification is also adopted in this paper, with different implementation
of course.
As the merchandise to sell in micro auctions are of small value, the number
of biddable prices is often not very large in micro auctions. Especially when
multiple copies of the merchandise are available (e.g. when they are merchandise
in electronic form like music, newspaper and document) and thus tie is not a
problem, a small number of biddable prices are enough in micro auctions. So
efficient auction mechanisms only dealing with a small number of biddable prices
can be employed to achieve high efficiency in many micro auction applications.
3 Bid Privacy and Two Strategies
Bid privacy has a great influence on implementation of sealed-bid auctions in-
cluding sealed-bid micro auctions. Without bid privacy the other properties can
be easily achieved in a sealed-bid auction. Bid privacy actually implies that
sealed-bid auction should be an application of secure computation, which eval-
uates a function with encrypted inputs without revealing the inputs. As secure
computation is usually complex, sealed-bid auction is more difficult to design
when bid privacy is required. However, bid privacy is necessary in many sealed-
bid auction applications including micro auction. No matter whether the mer-
chandise to sell is of small value or not, the following two reasons support the
need of bid privacy.
1. Bidders want their bidding behaviours to be untraceable. Especially a bidder
does not want other people to know that he submits a certain bid in a certain
auction, which is a violation of his personal privacy and may violate his
benefit in a later auction.
2. Sellers should be prevented from knowing the bids or their distribution.
Otherwise they may gain some advantage when selling an identical or similar
merchandise in the future.
Currently, there are two methods to implement bid privacy: secure evaluation
and one-choice-per-price strategy. Secure evaluation is also called multiparty
computation, which employs an evaluation circuit composed of a few logic gates
to evaluate the encrypted bids and output the auction result. All of the auction
schemes in this category seal the bid bit-by-bit and employ an evaluation circuit
composed of a large number of logic gates to evaluate the sealed bids. A drawback
of secure computation is low efficiency.
One-choice-per-price strategy is also frequently applied in sealed-bid auctions
[6, 5, 3, 4] to achieve bid privacy. Under this strategy, each bidder must make a
choice (indicating willingness or unwillingness to pay) at every biddable price
while all his choices form his bidding vector. If a bidder is willing to pay a
price, he chooses an integer standing for “YES” as his choice at that price. If a
bidder is unwilling to pay a price, he chooses an integer standing for “NO” as
his choice at that price. Two common bid opening functions in one-choice-per-
price auction are downward searching function [5] and binary searching function
[6, 3, 4]. Downward searching function unseals the sealed choices price by price
downwards from the highest biddable price until a “YES” choice is unsealed at a
price. With binary searching function, a much shorter binary route is searched.
4 Micro Sealed-bid Auction
Note that the most important requirement for micro auction is low cost. So one-
choice-per-price strategy is chosen to implement micro auction as it is more
efficient. Our idea is choosing appropriate existing secure sealed-bid auction
schemes and optimize them into secure sealed-bid micro auction schemes. As
the first paper about micro auction, this paper only considers first bid auction
for simplicity. Namely, the bidder with the highest bid wins and pays the highest
bid. Solutions to more complex auction rules are left as a future work. Two such
attempts are made in this section. The first one employs binary search while the
second employs downward search.
4.1 Protocol 1 — Micro Sealed-bid Auction Employing Binary
Search
As pointed out in [3, 4], most existing first-bid sealed-bid auction schemes em-
ploying binary search are vulnerable to attacks and cannot guarantee correct-
ness when there is invalid bid. On the other hand, proof and verification of bid
validity are too costly ( at least 4w exponentiations for a bidder and 4nw expo-
nentiations for an auctioneer). So although bid opening through binary search
is efficient, there was not any efficient and publicly verifiable sealed-bid auction
scheme employing binary search until very recently two new sealed-bid auction
scheme employing binary search [3, 4] were proposed. These two schemes can
publicly guarantee correctness of auction without bid validity check. So these
two schemes [3, 4] can be used as prototype when sealed-bid micro auction is
designed. As [3] is more complex than [4] and has no advantage in efficiency
when the number of biddable prices is small, [4] is chosen as a prototype, which
is simplified and optimized into a secure sealed-bid micro auction scheme called
Protocol 1. The two-round submission in [4] is too complex and costly for a low-
cost micro auction. So it is simplified into one round. As a result, unconditional
bid confidentiality and fairness in [4] become dependent on a threshold trust on
the auctioneers. Bid confidentiality and fairness based on threshold trust should
be strong enough for micro auction. Threshold secret sharing in [4] is replaced
by simpler and more efficient ElGamal encryption with threshold distributed
decryption to seal the bids. Suppose there are w biddable prices p1, p2, . . . , pw in
decreasing order, n bidders B1, B2, . . . , Bn and m auctioneers A1, A2, . . . , Am.
Protocol 1 is as follows.
1. Preparation phase
A bulletin board is set up as a broadcast communication channel. An ElGa-
mal encryption system is set up. Large primes p and q are chosen such that
q is a factor of p − 1. The cyclic group with order q modulo p is denoted
as Q. Integer g is a generator Q. Private key x is randomly chosen from
Zq. Public key y = gx is published. The private key is shared among the
auctioneers using threshold secret sharing such that any set of auctioneers
can cooperate to perform decryption if and only if the number of cooperat-
ing auctioneers is over the sharing threshold. See [2] for more details about
ElGamal encryption algorithm with distributed decryption.
2. Bidding phase
Each bidder Bi selects his bidding vector (bi,1, bi,2, . . . , bi,w) as his choices
at p1, p2, . . . , pw where bi,l ∈ Zq for l = 1, 2, . . . , w. If he is willing to pay
pl, bi,l is a random integer in Q; if he is unwilling to pay pl, bi,l = 1. Then
he encrypts and signs his bid vector and publishes the encrypted bid vector
(ci,1, ci,2, . . . , ci,w) and signature on it on the bulletin board where ci,j =
(gri,j , bi,jyri,j ) and ri,j is randomly chosen from Zq.
3. Bid opening phase
The auctioneers cooperate to perform a binary search among the biddable
prices. At a price pl on the searching route, the auctioneers perform as fol-
lows.
(a) Bid randomization and combination
Each auctioneer Aj publishes a commitment (e.g. one-way hash func-
tion) of random integer Rj,i,l from Zq for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. After all
the commitments have been published, the auctioneers publish Rj,i,l
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n as randomizing factors of bi,l. Finally, they compute
Ri,l =
∑m






The auctioneers cooperate to decrypt cl and gets the decryption result
dl. If dl = 1, the search goes downwards. If dl > 1, the search goes
upwards.
Finally, the largest l satisfying dl > 0 is found, which is denoted as L. pL is
declared as the winning price.
4. Winner identification phase
All the bid choices at pL, c1,L, c2,L, . . . , cn,L, are decrypted by the auctioneers
into d1,L, d2,L, . . . , dn,L Any bidder submitting a bid choice larger than 1
at pL is the winner. The winner’s signature is verified and his identity is
published.
Theorem 1. Protocol 1 is correct. More precisely, with an overwhelmingly large
probability dl > 0 if and only if there is at least a bid choice indicating the
willingness to pay at pl.
Proof: Suppose D() is the decryption function of the employed ElGa-
mal encryption. If b1,l, b2,l, . . . , bn,l, all the bid choices at pl, are 1,








i,l = 1 mod p. If at least one
of b1,l, b2,l, . . . , bn,l is a random integer uniformly distributed in Q,








i,l mod p is uniformly distributed
in Q. So the probability that dl = 1 when there is a bid choice indicating the
willingness to pay at pl is 1/q, which is overwhelmingly small. 2
Theorem 2. Protocol 1 achieves bid privacy. More precisely, no information
about the losing bids is revealed except what can be deduced from the auction
result if the number of colluding auctioneers is not over the sharing threshold of
the private key.
Proof: When all the bid choices at pl are 1, the only revealed information about
these bid choices is dl = 1 if the number of colluding auctioneers is not over the
sharing threshold of the private key. From the knowledge that dl = 1, it can be
deduced that with an overwhelmingly large probability all the bid choices at pl
is 1. However this revealed information can be deduced from the auction result.
So bid privacy is not compromised.
When there is at least one bid choice uniformly distributed in Q at pl, if
the number of colluding auctioneers is not over the sharing threshold of the
private key the only revealed information about these bid choices is dl, which
is uniformly distributed in Q. In this case the value of dl reveals that there is
at least one none-one bid choice at pl with an overwhelmingly large probability.
However this revealed information can be deduced from the auction result.
No other information is revealed if the number of colluding auctioneers is not
over the sharing threshold of the private key as given two different sets of bid
choices at pl from Qn, the two distributions of dl are indistinguishable (both
are uniformly distributed in Q). 2
Protocol 1 is publicly verifiable and achieves bid confidentiality and fairness
with a threshold trust on the auctioneers. If a reliable digital signature scheme is
employed for the bidders to sign their bids, this scheme achieves non-repudiation.
If a bid choice indicating willingness to pay is randomly chosen from Q − {1},
the auction scheme is correct with an even larger probability.
4.2 Protocol 2 — Micro Sealed-bid Auction Employing Downward
Search
Usually downward search needs much more searching rounds than binary search,
so often compromises efficiency. However, as mentioned in Section 2, only a small
number of biddable prices are needed in micro auction when tie is not a problem
(e.g. when multiple copies of the merchandise are available). In this case there
is not a great difference between w and log2 w as w, the number of biddable
prices, is very small. So, if each searching round is very efficient, downward
search can also achieve high efficiency. To our knowledge, it is very difficult
to achieve high efficiency in each searching round with binary search (a few
exponentiations are always needed as no bidding choice can be revealed), while
it is possible to achieve high efficiency in each searching round with downward
search (computation of exponentiation may be avoided as the bid choices can
be simply directly decrypted). Therefore a downward search mechanism with
efficient computation in each round is needed to design a micro sealed-bid auction
with a small number of biddable prices. At the same time, communication must
be efficient and non-interactive bid opening (without communication between
the bidders and auctioneers) must be employed.
Unfortunately, none of the existing sealed-bid auction schemes employing
downward search can provide this searching mechanism as they are inefficient
either in computation or communication. So none of the existing sealed-bid auc-
tion schemes employing downward search can be used as a prototype.
However, a solution can still be found to design an efficient micro sealed-bid
auction scheme with downward search: modify the auction scheme in [3] and
replace the binary search in [3] with downward search. In the auction scheme in
[3], bid sealing and bid opening are very efficient. Goldwasser-Micali encryption
is employed in [3] for bid sealing, which averagely only costs 1.5 multiplications.
Goldwasser-Micali decryption is employed in [3] for bid opening, which costs no
more than several multiplications. However, to implement binary search without
revealing any bid, complex and costly cut-and-choose strategy and zero knowl-
edge proof are implemented in each round of search. So the binary search in [3] is
complex and not very efficient. As the number of biddable prices is small in micro
auction, the auction scheme in [3] can be optimized by replacing binary search
with downward search, during each round of which all the bid choices at the cor-
responding price are simply decrypted. The new opening function is very simple
and efficient as in each round only n instances of Goldwasser-Micali decryption
are employed. After the optimization, the new auction scheme is very simple and
efficient in both bid sealing and bid opening. The new micro sealed-bid auction
scheme is called Protocol 2 and described as follows.
1. Preparation phase
A bulletin board, acting as a broadcast communication channel, is set up,
where the auction rule is published. m auctioneers A1, A2, . . . , Am are em-
ployed. Each Ak sets up a Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme with modu-
lus Nk, public key yk, encryption function Ek() and decryption functionDk()
for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m where Nk is the product of two secret large primes and
yk is a quadratic non-residue modulo Nk with Jacobi symbol 1. The existing
Goldwasser-Micali encryption algorithm is slightly modified as follows.
– Message space and ciphertext space: {1,−1} −→ Q where Q contains all
the integers with Jacobi symbol 1.
– Encryption
• If the message is 1, a ciphertext for the kth auctioneer is x2 mod Nk
where x is randomly chose from Z∗Nk .
• If the message is -1, the ciphertext for the kth auctioneer is yx2 mod
Nk where x is randomly chose from Z∗Nk .
– Decryption: If an integer with Jacob symbol -1 is given as the ciphertext,
the decryption fails and the integer is declared as an invalid ciphertext1.
If a valid ciphertext is given, output the Legendre symbol of the ci-
phertext. When necessary, validity of decryption can be publicly proved:
publishing a square root of the ciphertext when the decryption outputs
1 or publishing a square root of product of the ciphertext and the public
key when the decryption outputs -1.
The modified Goldwasser-Micali encryption algorithm is semantically secure
like the original Goldwasser-Micali encryption algorithm as the only change
in the modification is replacing 0 with -1 in the message space.
2. Bidding phase
Each bidder Bi chooses bi,j , his bidding choice at the jth biddable price for
j = 1, 2, . . . , w. If he is willing to pay pj , Bi chooses bi,j = −1. If he is
not willing to pay pj , Bi chooses bi,j = 1. Then Bi randomly chooses bi,j,k
from {1,−1} for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m such that bi,j =
∏m
k=1 bi,j,k. Finally, Bi
calculates ci,j,k = Ek(bi,j,k) for j = 1, 2, . . . , w and k = 1, 2, . . . ,m, then
signs and publishes them on the bulletin board.
3. Bid opening phase
At price p1, each auctioneer Ak calculates di,1,k = Dk(ci,1,k) for i =
1, 2, . . . , n and proves validity of decryption. Then di,1 =
∏m
k=1 di,1,k is cal-
culated for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. If there is any bid choice di,1 equivalent to -1, it
1 Computation for Jacob symbol is efficient and comparable to a multiplication, so
invalid ciphertext can be discovered easily.
is the winning bid. If di,1 = 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, there is no bidder willing to
pay p1 and ci,2,k for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, the bid choices at p2, are opened with
proof of validity of decryption. The search goes downwards until bid choice
equivalent to -1 is found as the winning bid.
4. Winner identification phase
The signature on the winning bid is verified and the winner is identified.
Theorem 3. Protocol 2 is correct. More precisely, there exist i in {1, 2, . . . , n}
such that di,j = −1 if and only if there is at least a bid choice indicating the








k=1 bi,1,k = bi,j So there exist i in {1, 2, . . . , n} such that di,j = −1 if and only
if there is at least a bid choice indicating the willingness to pay at pj . 2
Theorem 4. Protocol 2 achieves bid privacy. More precisely, no information
about the losing bids is revealed except what can be deduced from the auction
result if at least one auctioneer does not conspire.
Proof: As downward search is employed, only the bid choices no lower than
the winning price are opened. Every bid choice lower than the winning price
is shared among the auctioneers. Every bid choice is the product of its shares,
which are randomly chosen. Also note that the modified Goldwasser-Micali en-
cryption algorithm is semantically secure and no information is revealed from an
encrypted bid choice or bid choice share. So at a price pj lower than the winning
price, even if m− 1 colluding auctioneers put their shares together, they get no
information about any bi,j as no matter whether bi,j = 1 or bi,j = −1, the m− 1
shares of it are uniformly distributed in {1,−1}m−1, which is indistinguishable.
So no bid choice lower than the winning price is revealed except what can
be deduced from the auction result if at least one auctioneer does not conspire. 2
Protocol 2 is publicly verifiable and achieves bid confidentiality and fair-
ness with a m-out-of-m trust on the auctioneers. If a reliable digital signature
scheme is employed for the bidders to sign their bids, this scheme achieves non-
repudiation. As no exponentiation computation is needed in bid sealing and bid
opening, this auction scheme is efficient, especially when the number of biddable
prices is small.
5 Further Improvement
Protocol 1 is more efficient than the existing sealed-bid auction schemes with
bid privacy and is suitable for micro auction. Protocol 2 provides an efficient
solution to micro auction as well when the number of biddable prices is small.
However they still have drawbacks. Firstly, they are still not efficient enough for
micro auction with a computational cost of at least O(m(n + (n + 1) log2 w))
exponentiations and O(wmn) exponentiations respectively. So their cost may
still be higher than the value of the merchandise in some micro auction applica-
tions. Secondly, Protocol 2 is only efficient when the number of biddable prices
is small. When tie is concern and the number of biddable prices cannot be too
small,Protocol 2 is not efficient enough for micro auction.
So further improvement work (especially in efficiency) is still needed in these
two protocols. Unfortunately, efficiency improvement is difficult in Protocol 1.
However, in Protocol 2 a dramatic efficiency improvement can be made. The
efficiency bottleneck in Protocol 2 lies in proof of validity of decryption of the
bid choices in Step 3 (bid opening phase): to publicly prove validity of a decryp-
tion, a square root must be calculated, whose cost approximately equals O(1)
exponentiations. A solution to this efficiency bottleneck is to batch prove validity
of multiple decryptions, which is similar to the idea of aggregate verification in
micro payment system [1]. Namely, when M integers c1, c2, . . . , cM need proving
to be quadratic residues, a batch proof instead ofM separate proofs can be used,
so that invalid decryption by the auctioneers can be detected. The batch proof
is described in Figure 1.
1. S, a random subset of {1, 2, . . . ,M}, is chosen.
2. Square root of
∏
i∈S ci is provided.
3. Repeat the operations above T times.
Fig. 1. Batch proof of quadratic residues
Theorem 5. If there is at least one quadratic non-residue among c1, c2, . . . , cM ,
the proof in Figure 1 can succeed with a probability no more than 2−T .
Proof: Suppose cv is a quadratic non-residue where 1 ≤ v ≤M Note that half of
the subsets of {c1, c2, . . . , cM} contain cv and the other half do not contain cv.
So all the subsets of {c1, c2, . . . , cM} can be divided into pairs such that in each
pair the only difference between the two subsets is that one of them contains cv
and the other does not contain cv. Note that in each pair of the subsets, the
product of one subset’s elements must be a quadratic residue while the product
of the other subset’s elements must be a quadratic non-residue. Namely, half of
the subsets of {c1, c2, . . . , cM} contain elements whose product is a quadratic
residue and the other half of the subsets of {c1, c2, . . . , cM} contain elements
whose product is a quadratic non-residue. So square root of
∏
i∈S ci can be
provided with a probability 0.5 when S is randomly chosen from {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
Therefore, if there is at least one quadratic non-residue among c1, c2, . . . , cM ,
proof in Figure 1 can succeed with a probability no more than 2−T . 2
The batch proof technique in Figure 1 can be employed to improve efficiency
of Protocol 2, where each auctioneer acts as a prover and the random subsets
are chosen according to a one-way hash function of the decryption result2. In
Protocol 2, each auctioneer has to perform O(nw) decryptions, so has to give
O(nw) instances of proof of quadratic residue. Normally, computation of O(nw)
square roots (costing O(nw) exponentiations) is needed in every auctioneer’s
proof of decryption validity. When the batch proof technique in Figure 1 is
applied to prove validity of decryption, only T square roots need calculating
for each auctioneer. Although each auctioneer has a probability of 2−T to cheat
successfully, it is worthless for him to risk his reputation or qualification with
so low a success rate for a small-value merchandise. Actually, when T is larger
than 20, the success rate is less than 0.000001 when there is incorrect decryption,
which is small enough to deter an auctioneer from cheating in a micro auction. So
this efficiency improvement by batch proof is appropriate in micro auction. After
this improvement, only a small constant number of exponentiations are needed in
protocol 2. Besides greatly improving efficiency, this optimisation is not affected
by the number of biddable prices. Namely, even when tie is a concern and a
large number of biddable prices is needed, high efficiency can still be achieved.
Moreover, batch proof can be further extended so that each auctioneer’s proof
of quadratic residue in multiple micro auction processes during a fixed period
can be batched into computation of T square roots.
6 Conclusion
Requirements for micro auctions and methods to design sealed-bid micro auc-
tions are surveyed in this paper. The first two secure micro sealed-bid e-auctions
schemes are proposed in this paper. They can satisfy all the security require-
ments necessary for micro auction. Moreover, these two schemes are efficient,
especially when the number of biddable prices is small (as in most micro auc-
tions). The second scheme is further improved in efficiency by batch proof such
that only a small constant number of exponentiations are needed. Although in-
stant verification is sacrificed after the optimisation, the sacrifice is tolerable in
micro auctions.
Efficiency of the micro auction schemes in this paper and their prototypes
are compared in Table 1, where ElGamal encryption and RSA signature are em-
ployed and the number of exponentiations are counted. An example is given in
Table 1, where w = 16, n = 200, m = 5 and T = 20. Table 1 clearly demon-
strates that the micro auction schemes proposed in this paper (especially the
optimised Protocol 2) are very efficient. Contributions of the paper are illus-
trated in Table 2. It is clearly demonstrated in Table 2 that very high efficiency
can be achieved for micro auction without compromising bid privacy by sacri-
ficing unconditional fairness and instant verification, which can be tolerated in
micro auction.
2 For example, the hash function has an N -bit output z = z1z2 . . . zN while an auc-
tioneer has to prove N quadratic residues c1, c2, . . . , cN . ci is chosen into the random
subset if and only if zi = 1.
Table 1. Efficiency of Micro Auction Schemes
Schemes Computation
bidder example auctioneer example
[4] (3m+ 3)w + 1 289 1 + 5n+ 5n log2 w 5001
Protocol 1 2w + 1 33 (n+ 2) log2 w + 2n+ 1 1209
[3] 1 1 about (mn+ 4m+ n) log2 w 4880
Protocol 2 1 1 0.5wn 1600
Optimised Protocol 2 1 1 T 20
Table 2. Contribution of the Micro Auction Schemes
Schemes Fairness Communi- Search Biddable Verification Computation
-cation style prices efficiency
[4] Unconditional 2 rounds Binary Limited Instant Normal
Protocol 1 Trust-based 1 round Binary Limited Instant High
[3] Trust-based 1 round Binary Limited Instant Normal
Protocol 2 Trust-based 1 round Downward Limited Instant High
Optimised Trust-based 1 round Downward Unlimited Batched Very high
Protocol 2
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